

Checklist Management System audit

Operator ⁽¹⁾	Date	Inspector (Name/signature) ⁽²⁾	Ref.
Purpose:			
Audit team composition:		Auditees names:	

⁽²⁾ By signing this checklist, I hereby confirm that, at the time of performing this activity, I did not have any conflict of interest to declare regarding the above-mentioned operator ⁽¹⁾.

No	Ref Non-compliance	Non-compliances

List of remarks	
Ref remarks	Remarks

Additional notes/comments:

NA = Not Applicable; C = Compliant; NC = Not Compliant; R = Remark; N/R = Not reviewed
P = Present; S = Suitable; O = Operating; E = Effective

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
1. Safety policy and objectives						
1.1 Management commitment, 1.1.1 Safety policy , sign off and periodical review						
ORO.GEN.200(a)(2)	(a) The safety policy should: (1) be endorsed by the accountable manager	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		There is a safety policy, signed by the AM, which includes a commitment to continuous improvement; observes all applicable legal requirements and standards; and considers best practices.	The safety policy is easy to read. The content is customised to the operator	The safety policy is reviewed periodically to ensure it remains relevant to the operator.		The AM has a clear understanding of the safety policy and is fully engaged in implementing it.
		- Interview the AM and NPs to assess their knowledge and understanding of the safety policy. - Check evidence that the AM takes informed decisions in accordance with the safety policy. - Check that ‘safety’ is key to the policy and remains a highest priority. - Check that the safety policy is reviewed periodically for content and currency. - Check that the safety policy includes a commitment to continuous improvement; observes all applicable legal requirements and standards; and considers best practices.	☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R		
1.1 Management commitment, 1.1.2 Safety policy and ressources						
ORO.GEN.200(a)(2)	(b) The safety policy should include a commitment: (3) to provide appropriate resources;	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		The safety policy includes a statement to provide appropriate resources.	There is a process for assessing resources and addressing any shortfalls; needs are discussed at the right level of management.	The operator is assessing the resources being provided to deliver a safe service and taking action to address any shortfalls.		The operator is reviewing and taking action to address any forecasted shortfalls in resources. Needs are anticipated and forecasted, notably using the principles of the ‘management of changes’.
			Volume and significance of the contracted activities (to and from) are properly factored for the determination of the resources to deliver safe operations.			
			Appropriate resources are allocated in the case of multiple approvals, factoring the complexity of the operations.			

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations	PSOE	Eval	Description
		- Review available resources including personnel, equipment and financial, taking into account the number of aircraft, the type of operations and the complexity of the operator. - How does the operator manage resources by anticipating and addressing any shortfalls? - Are there sufficient and competent personnel? How does the operator assess it? - Review targeted resources vs actual resources. - Check whether the resources are discussed with the AM or during SRB meeting (or equivalent), as appropriate. - Guarantee that strategy is not only defined according to the current resources but is also based on the needed resources and ways of working to appropriately mitigate the key safety risks. - Check whether any fatigue issues, lack of resources, human performance weaknesses are reported, notably through the internal safety reporting scheme. - Consider the operator working time scheme and, if appropriate, implementation of Directive 2003/88/EC. Where applicable, check implementation of FRMS, FTL etc. - Check whether the principles of 'management of changes' are applied to anticipate the resources in case of changes. - Assess the situation when the operator holds multiple approvals. - Check the need for Safety Action Group(s) to assist or act on behalf of the safety Manager or the SRB	☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	
1.1 Management commitment, 1.1.3 Communication of the Safety policy					
ORO.GEN.200(a)(2)	The safety policy should: f) be communicated, with visible endorsement, throughout the operator	Present There is a means in place for the communication of the safety policy and its associated objectives. The management commitment to safety is documented within the safety policy.	Suitable The safety policy and its associated objectives are clearly visible (or reachable) to all staff (e.g. consider multiple sites, countries). The safety policy is understandable (consider multiple languages).	Operating The safety policy and its associated objectives are communicated to all personnel (including relevant contracted staff and organisations). The AM and the senior management team are promoting their commitment to the safety policy through active and visible participation in the SMS.	Effective People across the operator are familiar with the safety policy and its associated objectives and can describe their obligations in respect of the safety policy and the internal safety reporting scheme.
		- Review how the safety policy is communicated. - Safety policy is clearly visible (or reachable, depending on the structure and size of the operator) to all staff including relevant contracted staff and third-party organisations. - Interview staff to determine to what extent the safety values and objectives from the safety policy are known, as well as how readable and understandable they are.	☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R	

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
		- Check evidences that all employees and key stakeholders contribute to the safe operations of the system in accordance with the safety policy. - Question managers and staff regarding knowledge of the safety policy and its associated objectives. - Evidence that senior management involved in safety activities participate to safety meetings, training, conferences, etc.			☐ N/R	
1.1 Management commitment, 1.1.4 Safety policy, commitment and positive safety culture						
ORO.GEN.200(a)(2)	(a) The safety policy should (2) reflect organisational commitments regarding safety and its proactive and systematic management (b) The safety policy should include a commitment: (4) to enforce safety as one primary responsibility of all managers;	Present The safety policy is documented including the promotion of a positive safety culture. The safety policy highlights the primary responsibility for safety of all employees to proactively manage risks. The safety policy contains the main attributes of a positive safety culture, including a commitment to safety leadership and to a Just Culture across the operator.	Suitable The safety policy describes the commitment of all relevant staff involved in safety activities. A standard code of ethics or behaviour is documented and appropriate to the type of safety activities.	Operating The safety policy and associated positive safety culture are operationally implemented and promoted at working level by the AM and the key managers involved in safety activities.		Effective The safety policy, its implementation and commitment are reviewed with the AM and senior management on a regular basis. The organisational commitment to safety addresses interactions with key external stakeholders. The internal safety reporting scheme is known and used without fears of reprisal. Assessment results What to
		- The managers involved in safety activities are familiar with the key elements of the safety policy and its associated objectives, including the positive safety culture. - Senior management involved in safety activities are effectively involved in the (safety) management system and proactively managing safety policy, positive safety culture and objective processes set forth by the operator to proactively manage risks. - Check how a positive safety culture is encouraged and impacts the overall effectiveness, notably for the safety reporting system and the actions thereof. Evidence of senior management participation in safety meetings, training, conferences etc. where positive safety culture is promoted. - Evidence of proactive behaviours by the managers involved in safety activities, demonstrating continuous leadership and continuous improvement. - Relationship building with Competent Authorities and other key stakeholders (e.g. feedback, trust, exchange of information). - Feedback from safety surveys that include specific just culture aspects. Confirmation that the internal safety reporting scheme is known and used without fears of reprisal. - Evidence that people do not fear to report in respect of the internal safety reporting scheme.		☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
1.1 Management commitment, 1.1.5 Safety policy and just culture						
ORO.GEN.200(a)(2) Reg. 376/2014 Article 16(9)(10)(11) ORO.AOC.130(b)	(b) The safety policy should include a commitment: (5) not to blame someone for reporting something which would not have been otherwise detected. The operator shall, after consulting its staff representatives, adopt internal rules describing how ‘just culture’ principles are guaranteed and implemented within its organisation It should clearly indicate which types of behaviours are unacceptable related to the operator’s aviation activities and include the circumstances under which disciplinary action would not apply. When a FDM programme is established (aeroplanes with MCTOM>27t), it shall be non-punitive and contain adequate safeguards to protect the source(s) of the data.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		A just culture policy and principles have been defined.	The just culture policy (or in any other related document) clearly identifies acceptable and unacceptable behaviours. The principles ensure that the policy can be applied consistently across the whole organisation. The just culture policy and principles are understandable and clearly visible (or reachable). Decision-making process related to the implementation of the just culture is designed according to the size of the operator (e.g. involvement of staff representatives, staff Committee, Unions etc.)	There is evidence of the Just Culture policy and supporting principles being applied and promoted to staff.		The Just Culture policy is applied in a fair and consistent manner and people trust the policy. There is evidence that the line between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour has been determined in consultation with staff representatives.
		• If an FDM is established, evidence of a procedure to prevent disclosure of crew identity, signed by all parties (including flight crew representatives), and containing elements (1) to (8) of paragraph (k) of AMC1 ORO.AOC.130. • Evidence that the FDM (if applicable) contains safeguards to protect the source of data (restricted access to authorised persons). • Check that guidance and governance are developed on how to apply the just culture policy • Evidence of when the just culture principles have been applied following an event. • Evidence of interventions from safety investigations addressing organisational issues rather than focusing only on the individual. • Review how the operator is monitoring voluntary reporting rates and review the number of aviation safety reports appropriate to the activities. • Safety Reports include the reporter’s own errors and events they are involved in (events where no one was watching). • Consider feedback on how the “just culture” policy is applied and perceived from staff. • Interview staff representatives to confirm that they agree with just culture policy and principles. • Check that staff are aware of the just culture policy and principles.		☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations	PSOE	Eval	Description
		Check against the non-legally binding European Corporate Just culture declaration and its implementation.			
1.1 Management commitment, 1.1.6 Safety objectives					
ORO.GEN.200(a)(2)	(c) Senior management should: (3) establish safety objectives and performance standards.	Present Safety objectives have been established that are consistent with the safety policy and communicated throughout the operator.	Suitable Safety objectives are relevant to the operator and its activities. They are monitored by the right level of (senior) managers Safety objectives are understandable and clearly visible. Safety objectives are aligned with the SSP and/or SPAS, when appropriate.	Operating Safety objectives are being measured and regularly reviewed, are relevant and are communicated throughout the operator. They are monitored through the SRB (or equivalent) and adjusted, when needed.	Effective Achievement of the safety objectives is being monitored by senior management and action taken to ensure they are being met. Associated qualitative and quantitative measures are in place. Safety objectives are not only aligned with the SSP and/or SPAS, but they are also compared with those of the risk profile sector. They are updated based on the latest relevant safety information available. The operator is sometimes involved in the elaboration of the SSP and/or SPAS. Continuous improvement of safety is effectively measured.
		- Assess whether the safety objectives are appropriate and relevant. - Discuss with the AM and the NPs about the operator's safety objectives and verify that they are clearly understood. - Through the safety performance measurement and monitoring, check whether the Safety objectives are being measured to monitor achievement through qualitative and quantitative means, such as SMART SPIs and SPTs. Check whether the safety objectives, as a minimum, target 'continuous improvement'. - Check the minutes of the SRB how the safety objectives are monitored. - Objectives are defined that will lead to an improvement in processes, outcomes, and the development of a positive safety culture. - Assess how safety objectives are communicated throughout the operator. Check how these safety objectives as well as their associated metrics are visible (or reachable) to all staff involved in safety activities. - Assess if the safety objectives have considered relevant documentation such as Industry sector risk profiles, State risk profiles, State safety objectives in the SSP and/or the SPAS and/or EPAS Volume 2, section 4.2, and Volume III. - Consider safety objectives identified as per article 76.6 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, if any. - Assess whether/how the outcome of the oversight internally and externally impacts the determination and monitoring of the safety objectives.	☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	

**Management System audit checklist
FLIGHT OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT**

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
1.2 Safety accountability and responsibilities, 1.2.1 Identification of the accountable manager.						
ORO.GEN.210	The operator shall appoint an accountable manager, who has the authority for ensuring that all activities can be financed and carried out in accordance with the applicable requirements. The accountable manager shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining an effective management system.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		An AM has been appointed with full responsibility and ultimate accountability for the SMS.	The AM has control of resources. In case of several approvals, the designation of the ‘Accountable Manager’ will reflect the governance structure, such as different SMS in each domain (with interfaces) or corporate SMS.	The AM ensures that the SMS is properly resourced, implemented and maintained and has the authority to stop the operation if there is an unacceptable level of safety risk. The AM is fully aware of his/her SMS roles and responsibilities. The AM is accessible to the staff.		The AM ensures that the performance of the SMS is being monitored, reviewed and improved. Beyond his/her SMS roles and responsibilities, the AM continuously promotes the safety policy, safety standards, and safety culture of the operator.
		• Evidence that the AM has the authority to provide sufficient resources for relevant safety improvements. • Evidence that the AM is fully aware of their SMS roles and responsibilities. • Evidence of decision making on risk acceptability. • Review SMS activities are being carried out in a timely manner and the SMS is sufficiently resourced. • Evidence of activities being stopped due to unacceptable level of safety risk. • Look for evidence that AM actions are consistent with the active promotion of a positive safety culture within the operator.		☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	
1.2 Safety accountability and responsibilities, 1.2.2 Accountabilities and responsibilities.						
ORO.GEN.200(a)(1) ORO.GEN.200(a)(3)	(a) The operator shall establish, implement and maintain a management system that includes: • clearly defined lines of responsibility and accountability throughout the operator, including a direct safety accountability of the accountable manager (b) Risk assessment and mitigation processes (2) The levels of management who have the authority to make decisions regarding the tolerability of safety risks should be specified.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		The safety accountability, authorities and responsibilities are clearly defined and documented.	Key safety roles have been identified for safety accountability, authorities, and responsibilities (for example, through job descriptions, job family descriptions, or organisational charts).	Individuals have been identified to fill key safety roles and are aware of and fulfil their safety responsibilities, authorities and accountabilities and encouraged to contribute to the SMS.		The AM and the senior management team are aware of the substantive / significant risks faced by the operator, and safety management system principles exist throughout the operator so that safety is part of the highest priority in the operator.
		• Question managers and staff regarding their roles and responsibilities. • Confirm senior managers are aware of the operator’s safety performance, its most significant risks and its safety objectives. • Evidence of managers having safety related performance targets. • Look for active participation of the management team in the SMS. • Evidence of appropriate risk mitigation, action, and ownership.		☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R	

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
		- The levels of management authorised to make decisions on risk acceptance are defined and applied. - Acceptance of risk is aligned with authorisations. - Check for any conflicts of interest and that they have been identified and managed.			☐ N/R	
1.3 Appointment, 1.3.1 Appointment of key personnel: safety manager						
ORO.GEN.200(a)(1)	The operator should identify a person who fulfils the role of safety manager and who is responsible for coordinating the safety-management-related processes and tasks. This person may be the accountable manager or a person with an operational role within the operator. If an FDM is established (aeroplanes with MCTOM>27t), the safety manager should be responsible for the identification and assessment of issues and their transmission to the manager(s) responsible for the process(es) concerned.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		A SM who is responsible for the implementation and maintenance of the SMS has been appointed with a direct reporting line with the AM.	The SM is competent. Sufficient time and resources are allocated to maintain the SMS, but not limited to, competent staff for safety investigation, analysis, auditing, and promotion.	The SM has implemented and is maintaining the SMS. The SM is in regular communication with the AM and escalates safety issues when appropriate. The SM is accessible to the staff.		The SM is competent to manage the SMS and identifying improvements in a timely manner. There is an established reporting scheme between the AM and the safety manager to timely and regularly report on the safety issues.
		- Consider whether the responsibilities for the implementation and maintenance of the SMS should be given to a full-time person or to a SM supported by a team, enough empowered to advocate safety in case of conflict of interest (e.g. avoiding a person having functional activities both in production and surveillance); - Check the availability of the SM (and supporting staff, if appropriate) to allocate sufficient time to the implementation and maintenance of the SMS - Check for any conflicts of interest and that they have been identified and managed. - Review SM role including credibility, competence, and status. - Review the training that the safety manager has received. - Evidence of maintained competency. - Review how the SM gets access to internal and external safety information. - Review how the SM communicates and engages with operational staff and senior management. - Review SM workload / allocated time to fulfil role. - Check there are sufficient resources for SMS activities in a timely manner such as safety investigation and surveys, analysis, assessing, safety meeting attendance, SMS implementation’s coherence (notably for the assessment of risks and the mitigation measures), periodic reports on safety performance, communication processes including identification and dissemination of safety related information (internally and externally), and safety promotion. - For operator s holding multiple certificates, the AM may identify a unique focal point, i.e. the ‘safety manager’. - Review of safety report action and closure timescales. - Interviews with the AM and SM.	☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R		

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
1.3 Appointment, 1.3.2 Appointment of key personnel (complex organisations)						
ORO.GEN.200(a)(1)	The management system of an operator should encompass safety by including a safety manager and a safety review board in the organisational structure. The safety manager should act as the focal point and be responsible for the development, administration and maintenance of an effective safety management system. The safety review board should be a high level committee that considers matters of strategic safety in support of the accountable manager’s safety accountability.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		The operator has established an SRB.	SRBs’ structure and frequency support the SMS functions across the operator. The scope of the SRBs includes safety risks and compliance issues. The attendance of the SRB includes at least the AM and the heads of functional areas.	There is evidence of meetings taking place detailing the attendance, discussions, and actions. The SRB monitor the effectiveness of the SMS and CMF by reviewing there are sufficient resources. Actions are being monitored. Qualitative/quantitative means have been established to measure and monitor the established safety objectives		SRBs include key stakeholders. The outcomes of the meetings are documented and communicated, and all actions are agreed, taken and followed up in a timely manner. The safety performance and safety objectives are reviewed and actioned as appropriate.
		- Review SRB structure and Terms of Reference for each committee / meeting. - Review SRB attendance levels (AM and NPs). - Review meeting records and actions. - Outcomes are communicated to the rest of the operator - Evidence of safety objectives, safety performance and compliance being reviewed and discussed at meetings. - Participants challenging what is being presented when there is limited evidence. - Senior management are aware of the most significant risks faced by the operator and the overall safety performance of the operator. - MS may be integrated for operators holding multiple certificates	☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R		
1.4 Coordination of emergency response planning (ERP)						
ORO.GEN.200(a)(3)	An ERP should be established that provides the actions to be taken by the operator or specified individuals in an emergency. The ERP should reflect the size, nature and complexity of the activities performed by the operator.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		An appropriate, coordinated ERP has been developed and distributed that defines the procedures, roles, responsibilities and actions of the various organisations and key personnel.	Key personnel have easy access to the relevant parts of the ERP at all times. The ERP defines the procedures, roles, responsibilities, and actions of the various organisations and key personnel. The frequency and methods for testing the ERP are defined. The coordination with other organisations (including non-	The ERP is reviewed and tested to make sure it remains up to date. Different scenarios with variations test the robustness of the ERP. Actions are taken to improve the ERP effectiveness.		There is evidence of coordination with other organisations through regular drills or crisis exercises, which are analysed for further improvement.

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
			aviation organisations) is defined with appropriate means.			
		• Verify whether the service provider is required to have an ERP or to coordinate with the operator’s ERP, according to the domain. • Review the emergency response plan and how the procedures, roles, responsibilities, and actions of the various organisations are defined Review how co-ordination with other organisations (including non-aviation organisations) is planned. • Review how ERP is distributed and where copies are held. • Interview key personnel and check they have access to the relevant parts of the ERP. • Check that different types of foreseeable emergencies have been considered. • Check how defined are the frequency and methods for testing the ERP. • Review when the plan was last reviewed and tested, and actions taken. • Verify that variations of the different scenarios are regularly considered to test the robustness of the ERP.	☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R		
1.5 Management system documentation, 1.5.1 Management system manual (or equivalent)						
ORO.GEN.200(a)(5)	(a) The operator’s management system documentation should at least include the following information: (1) a statement signed by the accountable manager to confirm that the operator will continuously work in accordance with the applicable requirements and the operator’s documentation, as required by this Annex; (2) the operator’s scope of activities; (3) the titles and names of persons referred to in ORO.GEN.210(a) and (b); (4) an operator chart showing the lines of responsibility between the persons referred to in ORO.GEN.210; (5) a general description and location of the facilities referred to in ORO.GEN.215; (6) procedures specifying how the operator ensures compliance with the applicable requirements; (7) the amendment procedure for the operator’s management system documentation.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		The SMS documentation includes the policies and processes that describe the operator’s safety management system and processes.	The scope of the activities under the SMS is clearly defined. SMS documentation is comprehensible. SMS documentation is consistent with other internal management systems and is representative of the actual processes in place. The manner and format of the SMS documentation is appropriate to the operator and readily available to all relevant personnel.	Changes to the SMS documentation are managed. Key personnel involved in SMS implementation is familiar with and follows the relevant parts of the SMS documentation, whereas employees are familiar with the content of the SMS documentation relevant to their activities		SMS Documentation is proactively reviewed for improvement.
		• Review the SMS documentation and the associated amendment procedures. • Check the manner and format of the SMS documentation, depending on the size, structure of the operator, its business model, such as volume and significance of the contracted activities (to and from). • Check for cross references to other documents and procedures. • Check availability of SMS documentation to all staff. • Check if staff knows who to contact (when needed) or where to find safety related documentation including procedures appropriate to their role.		☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
		Review the supporting SMS documentation (hazard logs, meeting minutes, safety performance reports, risk assessments, etc.).				
1.5.Management system documentation, 1.5.2 SMS records						
ORO.GEN.220	The operator shall establish a system of record-keeping that allows adequate storage and reliable traceability of all activities developed, covering in particular all the elements indicated in ORO.GEN.200.	Present	Suitable	Operati,g		Effective
		The SMS documentation defines the SMS outputs and which records of SMS activities will be stored. Records to be stored, storage period, and location are identified.	Data protection and confidentiality rules have been defined.	SMS activities are appropriately stored and found to be complete and consistent with appropriate data protection and confidentiality control rules.		SMS records are routinely used as inputs for safety management related tasks and continuous improvement of the SMS. SMS documentation, including SMS related records, are regularly reviewed and updated with appropriate version control in place.
		- Check how safety records are stored and version controlled. - Data protection and confidentiality rules have been defined and are consistently applied. - Check if appropriate staff is aware of the records control processes and procedures. - Check that the SMS records include the decisions taken during the SRB are supported by evidence.		☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	
2. Safety risk assessment						
2.1 Flight data monitoring (if applicable)						
ORO.AOC.130	(a) The operator shall establish and maintain a flight data monitoring programme, which shall be integrated in its management system, for aeroplanes with a maximum certificated take-off mass of more than 27 000 kg. FDM analysis techniques should comprise the following: (1) Exceedance detection: searching for deviations from aircraft flight manual limits and standard operating procedures. A set of core events should be selected to cover the main areas of interest for the operator and as much as possible the most significant risks identified by the operator. A sample list is provided in Appendix 1 to AMC1 ORO.AOC.130. The event detection limits should be continuously reviewed to reflect the operator's current operating procedures. (2) All flights measurement: a system defining what is normal practice. This may be accomplished by retaining various snapshots of information from each flight.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		A flight data monitoring process is described in the operator's procedures. It includes a list of core events deviating from AFM limits and SOPs, with associated event detection limits. <i>Note: operators may decide not to include the event detection limits in the OM, in order to avoid that pilots focus on the detection limits when flying more than on adherence to SOPs.</i>	The FDM events and associated limits allow to identify areas of operational risk and quantify current safety margins.	FDM is applied to all relevant aeroplanes of the fleet, with a sufficiently representative capture. Core events are monitored in a short and long term manner through the analysis of statistics based on meaningful event detection limits.		Event detection limits are consistently reviewed to reflect the operator's current SOPs.
		- Review the procedure describing the FDM process. - Ask for the core events and associated event detection limits and verify that they are consistent with appendix 1 to AMC1 ORO.AOC.130, they do not include only AFM limits but also SOPs, they are meaningful (not too high limits).		☐ P ☐ S ☐ O	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC	

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
	(3) Statistics — a series of data collected to support the analysis process: this technique should include the number of flights flown per aircraft and sector details sufficient to generate rate and trend information. The data recovery strategy should ensure a sufficiently representative capture of flight information to maintain an overview of operations. Data analysis should be performed sufficiently frequently to enable action to be taken on significant safety issues. When significant risk-bearing incidents are detected by FDM but are not the subject of mandatory occurrence reporting by the crew, they should submit a retrospective report.	- Ask for the data capture rates per aeroplane to ensure a sufficiently representative capture of information. In case of outbases, ask to the method to ensure that QAR data is retrieved and sent for analysis. - Verify that the safety manager / department receives regular statistics, including exceedances and trends. - Verify that when risk-bearing incidents are detected by FDM but are not the subject of mandatory occurrence reporting by the crew, they are required to submit a retrospective report. - Check that negative trends are identified and considered within the SRM process. - Check that negative trends identified via the FDM are discussed during SRB meetings.		☐ E	☐ R ☐ N/R	
2.2 Flight crew support programme						
CAT.GEN.MPA.215	<u>Flight crew support programme</u> The operator shall enable, facilitate and ensure access to a proactive and non-punitive support programme that will assist and support flight crew in recognising, coping with, and overcoming any problem which might negatively affect their ability to safely exercise the privileges of their licence. Such access shall be made available to all flight crew.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		A FC support programme is described in the operator's procedures.	The FC support programme is accessible to all FC.	The FC support programme is used by crew whenever necessary.		The support programme adequately provided support to to FC who have been referred.
		- Check that the operator's support programme: - enable self-declaration or referral in case of a decrease in a FC's medical fitness with an emphasis on prevention and early support; and - allow the FC (if appropriate) to receive temporary relief from flight duties and be referred to professional advice. - Check that the support programme contains at least: - procedures including education of FC regarding self-awareness and facilitation of self-referral; - assistance provided by professionals, including mental and psychological health professionals with relevant knowledge of the aviation environment; - involvement of trained peers, where trained peers are available; - monitoring of the efficiency and effectiveness of the programme; - monitoring and support of the process of returning to work; - management of risks resulting from fear of loss of licence; and - a referral system to an aero-medical examiner in defined cases raising serious safety concerns. - Check that: - The operator promote the access to the support programme for all FC		☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	

Management System audit checklist
FLIGHT OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
		Initial and recurrent training is defined and provided to all professionals involved.				
CAT.GEN.MPA.215	<u>Processing of personnel data</u> Without prejudice to applicable national legislation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, the protection of the confidentiality of data shall be a precondition for an effective support programme as it encourages the use of such a programme and ensures its integrity.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		The confidentiality and protection of data principles are embedded into the operator's procedures related to the FC support programme.	The policy allows the protection of personal data.	The operator is implementing the dataprotection and confidentiality principles.		No disclosure of the identify of any referred FC took place.
		- Check that the operator ensures that: - The personal data of referred FC are handled in a confidential, non-stigmatising, and safe environment. - A culture of mutual trust and cooperation is maintained. - Disclosure of data to the operator may only be granted in an anonymised manner. - an agreement with related procedures is in place between the operator and the support programme on how to proceed in case of a serious safety concern.			☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R
CAT.GEN.MPA.215	Support programme linked to the management system	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		The link with the management system, including the transfer of data is described in the procedures based on confidentiality principles.	The link with the management system allows the transfer of relevant data based on confidentiality principles.	Data from the support programme has been transferred to the management system.		The output of the support programme has been used by the operator's safety management process.
		- Check that the operator's procedures foresee the transfer of data from the support programme to the management system based on confidentiality principles. - Check that all data transferred to the management system has been adequately anonymised and aggregated to ensure confidentiality. - Check that that data has been transferred and has been used by the management in the safety management activities.			☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R
2.3. Hazard/occurrences, 2.3.1 Hazard identification						
ORO.GEN.200(a)(3)	(a) The operator shall establish, implement and maintain a management system that includes: (3) the identification of aviation safety hazards entailed by the activities of the operator, their evaluation and the management of associated risks, including taking actions to mitigate the risk and verify their effectiveness. Hazard identification should be based on a combination of reactive and proactive methods.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		There is a process that defines how hazards are identified through reactive and proactive methods, using multiples sources. The methodology to define the criteria for safety investigations is documented.	Multiple sources of hazards (internal and external) are considered and reviewed, as appropriate in the domain. The interfaces are properly addressed. The data analysis process enables gaining useable safety information.	The hazards are identified and documented. Technical, human, and organisational factors related hazards are being considered. The criteria for safety investigations are identified and applied. Safety investigations are carried out and recorded.		The operator has processes and means that capture hazards (technical, environmental, human, and organisational factors related), which are maintained and reviewed to ensure they remain up to date. The operator is continuously and proactively identifying hazards (technical, environmental, human, and organisational

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations	PSOE	Eval	Description
		The process includes the management of organisational change when it impacts safety. Hazards are documented in an easy-to-understand format. The level of sign-off for safety investigations is defined and adequate to the level of risk. The safety hazards at organisation's level are consistent with the ones identified at authority's level, where relevant.			factors related) related to its activities and operational environment and involves all key personnel and relevant stakeholders. Hazards are assessed in a systematic and timely manner. Personnel express confidence and trust in the operator's reporting policy and processes. The criteria for safety investigations are continuously updated to include internal and external sources as required.
		- Review how hazards are identified, analysed, addressed, and recorded. - Review structure and layout of hazard log. - Consider hazards related to: - Possible accident or serious incident scenarios, - Technical factors as well as human and organisational factors (e.g. hazards linked to human performance and organisation's performance as part of the systemic risk management), - Business decisions and processes, - Third party organisations. - Review what internal and external sources of hazards are considered such as: safety reports / automatic data collection (such as FDM, ATS/ANS, health monitoring system), audits, safety surveys and/or studies, investigations, inspections, brainstorming, Management of Change activities, security, cybersecurity, sanitary crisis, environmental, commercial and other external influences, compliance monitoring analysis; sector risk profile, etc.) - Check whether the identification of safety hazards considers the ones identified at authority's level (e.g. SSP/SMS interfaces and SPAS, State's safety risks or State risk profile (e.g. State's issues portfolio), EPAS, EASA and State's ASR, EASA annual safety recommendations reviews, or through recognized International Organisations (like IATA, CANSO) ASRs; safety objectives, SIB; CZIB) - Check that risk assessments have been established for all flight over or near conflicts zones. - Investigations of safety occurrences establish causal/contributing factors (why it happened, not just what happened) and identify human and organisational contributing factors. - Assess to which extent the process is not limited to the reactive part (i.e. occurrences) but also considers the proactive approach (as proposed above). - Check how hazards identified from occurrences are processed. - Is the staff encouraged to report errors, near misses through the reporting system ensuring adequate protection of the reporter?	☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations	PSOE	Eval	Description
		Is there a mechanism in place to document the hazard log in a way that enables its evolution over time? Is the hazard log periodically reviewed?			
2.3. Hazard/occurrences, 2.3.2 Occurrences reporting (Reg. (EU) 376/2014)					
Reg. (EU) 376/2014, Art. 4 and 5	Each organisation established in a Member State shall establish a mandatory reporting system to facilitate the collection of details of occurrences. Each organisation established in a Member State shall establish a voluntary reporting system.	Present There is a confidential reporting system to capture mandatory occurrences and voluntary reports that includes a feedback system and stored on a database. Responsibilities have been defined as required by Reg. (EU) 376/2014. The process identifies how reports are actioned.	Suitable The reporting system is accessible and easy to use for the personnel involved in the safety activities of the operator. There is an appropriate means to capture issues from third parties (partners, suppliers, contractors).	Operating The reporting system is simple to use, being used and accessible to all personnel. There is feedback to the reporter of any actions taken (or not taken), where appropriate, and to the rest of the organisation. People are aware and fulfil their responsibilities in respect of the reporting system	Effective Personnel express confidence and trust in the operator's reporting policy and process. The reporting system is being used to influence management decisions and continuous improvement. There is a healthy reporting system based on the pertinence of reports received. The reporting system contributes to the continuous improvement of the operator performance.
		- Verify that the responsibilities as required by Regulation (EU) 376/2014 have been defined and described in the job descriptions - Review the reporting system for access and ease of use [appropriateness of the reporting systems]. Depending on the size and complexity, the appropriateness of the reporting system can range from simple secured boxes to a digital system, including Apps to instal on mobile devices. - Check if staff trusts the reporting system, are familiar with it and know what should be reported. - Evidence that people do not fear to report in respect of the internal safety reporting scheme. - Evidence of feedback to reporter (or a feedback loop addressing the aggregation of reports with their analysis, depending on the volume of occurrences) - Assess volume and quality of reports including self-reporting. - Check availability to contracted organisations and customers to make reports. - Check whether a taxonomy is defined and used. - Check relevant staff are aware of which occurrences should be mandatory. Verify how the Annexes to Regulation (EU) 2015/1018 are implemented and known by the staff.	☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	
Regulation (EU) 376/2014 Art.6(5) Art 7(3)	<u>Collection, evaluation and storage of the occurrences</u> Occurrences are collected, evaluated and stored in one or more database. The organisation has established a data quality checking process to improve data consistency, notably between	Present Designation of one or more persons to handle independently the collection and storage of details of mandatory occurrences.	Suitable The database and associated processes allow the adequate storage of occurrences.	Operating Reports are collected, evaluated, and stored. The classification between voluntary and mandatory is clear to all personnel and well applied.	Effective Database of occurrences adequately used and maintained in accordance with the established procedure, allowing meaningful analysis.

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
	the information collected initially and the report stored in the database.	There is one or more database of occurrences. Databases established by the operator shall be standardised to facilitate information exchange; and compatible with the ECCAIRS software and the ADREP taxonomy.				
		- Check procedures for the identification of responsibilities. - Check the mandatory / voluntary occurrences database(s). - Check compatibility with ECCAIRS. - Assess volume and quality of mandatory reports including self-reporting. Check mandatory reporting in the area of SPA approvals held (RVSM, MNPS, LVO, PBN, ETOPS,...). - Assess volume and quality of voluntary reports. - Verify that the classification criteria between mandatory and voluntary are well described and applied. - Verify if the operator has in place a data quality check to verify accuracy of the received report by means of FDM as an example. If no FDM is available verify if this check is performed by other means.		☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	
ORO.GEN.160(d) Regulation (EU) 376/2014 Art.4(9)	Mandatory occurrences are reported to the competent authority within the timeframe established by the regulation (72 hours).	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		Timescales are specified in the procedures – 72 hours. The responsibilities are defined.	The procedures allows the transmission of MOR within 72 h.	The operator has established a process to track all timeframes and exceedances. Mandatory occurrences are reported within the defined timescales.		As a result of its process to monitor reporting dates and possible exceedances, the operator takes effective measures to ensure that all occurrences are reported within the timeframes.
		- Check procedures - Verify implementation for sampled occurrences (notification within the timescales) - Check that occurrences reported on the operator by external organisations (e.g. ATC, aerodromes) also led to internal reports.		☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	
		Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
Regulation (EU) 376/2014 Art 13(1) and Art 7(2)	<u>Processing and analysis of occurrences</u> The organisation has developed a process to analyse occurrences in order to identify the safety hazards associated with identified occurrences or groups of occurrences.	Designation of one or more persons to handle independently the processing and analysis of details of occurrences.	The process allows the adequate analysis of occurrences reports received.	Reports are processed and analysed within the defined timescales.		Occurrence reports are effectively used as an input to the hazard identification process and to verify the effectiveness of mitigations.

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
	Occurrence reports include a safety risk classification for the occurrence concerned.	The operator has established a safety risk classification scheme for occurrence reports. All occurrences are safety risk assessed (mandatory and voluntary). The analysis and classification are stored in the database.		Analysis is carried out by appropriately trained personnel to identify root causes (why it happened, not just what happened). Coherence with the topics discussed during the SRB or safety committees' meetings is ensured.		
		- Check the operator's procedures - Confirm responsibilities with regards to occurrence analysis, storage and follow-up are clearly defined. - Check the training of the staff carrying out the analysis. - The system supports analysis, follow-up, and report to the relevant CA as mandated by Article 13 of Reg. (EU) 376/2014. There is a process in place to analyse safety data and safety information to look for trends and gain useable management information. - Analysis are carried out to identify root causes (why it happened, not just what happened). Check the quality of the analysis - Verify implementation through the sampling of occurrences. - Review report closure rates.		☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	
Regulation (EU) 376/2014 Art. 13(1), Art 13(2)	<u>Definition and implementation of appropriate corrective and preventive actions:</u> Based on the analysis of occurrences, the organisation determines any appropriate corrective or preventive action, required to improve aviation safety. When, following the analysis of occurrences, the organisation identifies any appropriate corrective or preventive action required to address actual or potential aviation safety deficiencies, it shall: (a) implement that action in a timely manner; and (b) establish a process to monitor the implementation and effectiveness of the action.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		The process for the analysis of occurrences, the identification of potential safety deficiencies, the definition of preventive and corrective actions to address them and the verification of their effectiveness is defined.	The analysis process allows the adequate identification of any appropriate corrective/preventive action(s) necessary.	Occurrences are regularly analysed and potential safety issues identified and addressed. Mitigations are defined (f.i. the SMART concept is used: specific, measurable, agreed, realistic and time-bounded), controlled (allocated to nominated persons with due dates), implemented and verified for implementation.		The reporting system is being used to make better management decision making and continuous improvement.
		- Check the operator's procedures - Verify the adequacy of the analysis and mitigations to demonstrate the reduction of the risks to an acceptable level. - Verify that the mitigations are controlled (owner and follow-up of actions). - Verify that the mitigations are implemented and verified for effective implementation. - Assess how senior management deal with the outputs of the reporting system.		☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
ORO.GEN.160(e) Regulation (EU) 376/2014 Art 5(5)	<u>Voluntary reports notification:</u> The organisation reports, in a timely manner, to the competent authority the details of voluntary occurrence reports and safety-related information which may involve an actual or potential aviation safety risk.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		The reporting process of voluntary occurrences which may involve an actual or a potential safety risk is described in the operator’s procedure.	The process allows the transmission of such voluntary reports in a timely manner.	The operator reports to its competent authority the details of voluntary occurrence reports involving an actual or potential risk.		As a result of its process to monitor reporting dates and possible exceedances, the operator takes effective measures to ensure that all analyses are reported within the timeframes.
		- Check the operator’s procedures - The operator has specified what it considers “timely manner” for voluntary reports. - Verify implementation through the sampling of voluntary occurrence reports classified as posing a risk for the timely notification.		☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	
Regulation (EU) 376/2014 Art 16(2) Art 6(1).	<u>Management of personnal details:</u> Personal details [names or addresses] are made available to staff of that organisation other than persons designated [to handle independently the collection, evaluation, processing, analysis and storage of details of occurrences] only where absolutely necessary in order to investigate occurrences with a view to enhancing aviation safety. The handling of reports is done with a view to preventing the use of information for purposes other than safety and the confidentiality of the identity of the reporter and of the persons mentioned in occurrence reports appropriately safeguarded, with a view to promoting ‘just culture’.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		Protection of the information source is established in the procedures.	The procedures allows the adequate management of personal data	Confidentiality of personal details is ensured, except when absolutely necessary.		Personnel express confidence and trust in the operator’s reporting policy and process. There is a healthy reporting system based on the volume of reporting and the quality of reports received.
		- Review how data protection and confidentiality is achieved. - Check that staff trust the reporting system.		☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	
Regulation (EU) 376/2014 Art 13(3) Art 16(2)	<u>Provision and dissemination of information:</u> The operator provides its employees and contracted personnel with information concerning the analysis of, and follow-up on, occurrences for which preventive or corrective action is taken. De-identified information shall be disseminated within the organisation as appropriate.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		The Process related to the provision/dissemination of information is described in the operator’s procedure.	The process allows the adequate provision/dissemination of information.	There is feedback to the reporter of any actions taken (or not taken) and, where appropriate, to the rest of the organisation.		Personnel express confidence and trust in the organisations reporting policy and process.
		- Evidence of feedback to reporter, within the organisation and to relevant third parties. - The feedback is de-identified.		☐ P ☐ S	☐ N/A ☐ C	

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
				☐ O ☐ E	☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	
2.4. Safety risk assessment and mitigation, 2.4.1 Analysis, assessment of the safety risks						
ORO.GEN.200(a)(3)	(a) The operator shall establish, implement and maintain a management system that includes: (3) the identification of aviation safety hazards entailed by the activities of the operator, <u>their evaluation</u> and the management of associated risks, including taking actions to mitigate the risk and verify their effectiveness.	Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective	
		There is a process for the analysis and assessment of safety risks.	The risk assessment methodology, including 'severity' and 'likelihood' usable criteria are defined and fit the service provider's actual environment, including consideration to the expert judgement when data are not available. The used definitions are sufficiently explicit or detailed. For the acceptance of the risk's level, the right level of organisation's authority within the organisation (responsibilities) in cooperation with the stakeholders is clearly defined.	Risk analysis and assessments are carried out in a consistent manner based on the defined process. Appropriate risks controls are being applied to reduce safety risks to an acceptable level, including timelines and allocation of responsibilities agreed with the stakeholders. Operational, technical, human and organisational factors are considered as part of the development of risks controls. Senior management is actively involved in medium and high risks and their mitigation and controls. Understanding of external inputs and outputs of safety risk management that should be addressed.	Risk analysis and assessments are reviewed for consistency and to identify improvements in the processes. Risk assessments are regularly reviewed to ensure they remain current. Risk acceptability criteria are used routinely, consistently applied in management decision making processes, and are regularly reviewed.	
		- Review risk classification scheme and procedures. - Check the methodology used to assess the risks; how this is documented, accurately defined, and used; check how the staff using that methodology is trained. - Check any assumptions made and whether they are reviewed. - Check that the process defines who can accept what level of risk. - Check that the level of risk that the operator is willing to accept is defined. - Severity and likelihood definitions and criteria are sufficiently defined (or that an alternative methodology is described) and adapted to the activities. Severity 'of what' ('possible worst scenario' and consequence) is also described. Differentiation between 'likelihood' and 'frequency' is understood.		☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations	PSOE	Eval	Description
		- Review whether risk assessments are carried out consistently and coherently across the organisation (e.g. consideration of various safety perspectives and views to make the relevant decision). - Review how issues are classified when there is insufficient quantitative data available. When expert judgement is used, a collaborative risk assessment process is used (e.g. various expert judgement through cross-functional disciplines such as Flight operations, Design, Production, Human Performance experts), taking into account different safety perspectives and views to make the relevant decision, to ensure the reproducibility of the assessment. - Consider how human performance is evaluated through the safety risk management and mitigation process - Check whether the outcome of the safety reporting system, including the mandatory and voluntary occurrence reporting systems, is used to test the robustness the risk assessment, including when the expert judgement was used. Is the network of stakeholders involved in the collection of data and safety information informing the risk assessments, notably for the risk at the interfaces? - Verify whether the risk assessments are updated when new data from the safety reporting system are available. Review what triggers a risk assessment and its review over time. Check that the risk register is being reviewed and monitored by the appropriate safety committee(s), where appropriate. Verify how experience, feedback and monitoring of recently published safety information serves that regular update. - Review layout of risk register e.g. initial assessment, residual risk, mitigation actions, ownership, associated safety performance and follow-up. - Sample identified hazards and how these are processed and documented. - Check which safety committee(s) or person(s) oversee the 'acceptability'. Check the availability of instructions about implementation of 'As Low As Reasonably Practical' (ALARP). Check the right level of authority for decision-making. - Evidence of risk reduction, evaluation of residual risk and risk acceptability, when appropriate, being applied in the data-driven decision-making. - Evidence that risks, including those that are not generated by the operator itself, are analysed and mitigated, without further transfer of risks. - Check how trends and emerging issues are identified and managed.			
2.4. Safety risk assessment and mitigation, 2.4.2 Control of the safety risks					
ORO.GEN.200(a)(3)	(a) The operator shall establish, implement and maintain a management system that includes: (3) the identification of aviation safety hazards entailed by the activities of the operator, their evaluation and <u>the</u>	Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
		The operator has a process in place to decide and apply the risk controls.	Responsibilities and timelines for determining and accepting the risk controls are defined.	Appropriate risk controls are being applied to reduce the risk to an acceptable level including timelines and allocation of responsibilities.	Risk controls are practical and sustainable, applied in a timely manner and do not create additional risks.

**Management System audit checklist
FLIGHT OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT**

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
	<u>management of associated risks, including taking actions to mitigate the risk and verify their effectiveness.</u>		Appropriate risk mitigation strategies and perspectives are considered.	The operator follows the process in place to make decisions and apply appropriate and effective risk controls. Human Performance are considered as part of the development of risk controls.		The effectiveness of the risks controls is monitored through safety performance, using qualitative and/or quantitative means. Risk controls take Human Performance into consideration.
		• Risk controls clearly identified. Evidence of risk controls being actioned and follow up. • Quantitative and/or qualitative means are used to monitor the effectiveness of the risk controls, such as to SMART SPIs, SPTs, alert levels. • Check how trends are monitored and used. • Aggregate risk is being considered. • Check whether the risk controls have reduced the residual risk. • Check that new risk controls do not create additional risks. • Check how the policy considers ALARP – verify the implementation of it. • Check how specific domain-related risks are appropriately controlled, such as Fatigue Risk Management, flight data monitoring, HUMS, subcontracting and interfaces, etc. • Check whether the acceptability of the risks is made at the right management level. • Operational managers and senior management have visibility of medium and high risk as well as their mitigation and controls. • Review the use of risk controls that rely solely on human intervention. • Risk controls consider human performance and organisational factors. • Verify how the effectiveness of the safety barriers for the significant risks at the interfaces is assured.		☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	
3. Safety assurance						
3.1 Safety performance monitoring and measurement, 3.1.1 Means to verify safety performance and to validate safety risks control effectiveness						
ORO.GEN.200(a)(1)	(3) <u>The safety review board should monitor:</u> (i) safety performance against the safety policy and objectives; (ii) that any safety action is taken in a timely manner; and (iii) the effectiveness of the operator’s safety management processes.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		The operator has a documented internal audit programme with a link to a management review process. There is a documented process to assess whether the appropriate risk controls are applied and effective with respect to SMS key processes. A person or group of persons with responsibilities for the monitoring function	Responsibilities, methods, and timelines for assessing risk controls are appropriately defined. Safety performance measurement targets the effectiveness of the mitigation measures addressing the key risks, and by extension, the safety objectives. Safety performance measurement is focused on what is important	Information from the reporting system(s), safety assurance, compliance monitoring activities or any other relevant source feeds back into the safety risk management process. Appropriate risk controls are being verified to assess whether they are applied and effective.		Appropriate risk controls are assessed, and actions taken to ensure they are effective and delivering a safe service. The reasons for ineffectiveness of risk controls are investigated. Human performance is taken into consideration. There is comprehensive integration of external and internal interfaces, as appropriate, into operator 's Safety Risk

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations	PSOE	Eval	Description
		have been identified and they have direct access to the AM. rather than what is easy to measure. The contribution of contracted organisations should be considered in the safety performance process, considering the potential effect it may have on the safety performance of the operator. Follow-up of the corrective/preventive actions plan is evidenced and reviewed by the relevant SMS governance body (i.e. Adequate authority level based on the size of the operator and the complexity of its operations). The interface between compliance-based audits and the safety risk management processes is described and operating.			Management and Safety Assurance processes. The outcome of the operator's safety performance considers and provides feedback to the SMS governance body, as relevant, for review and ultimately to the Competent Authority. The effectiveness of the SMS processes are reviewed on a regular basis.
		- Check if there is a mechanism in place to ensure that the operator utilises all relevant data feeding sources, to get a true picture of their risks, evaluate its safety performance; and, in time take appropriate actions and check their effectiveness. - Evidence of responsibilities, methods, and timelines to assess whether the risk controls are applied and effective: survey controls being assessed and monitored for effectiveness (e.g. audits, surveys, reviews, qualitative and/or quantitative means to measure and monitor safety performance such as SPIs, SPTs, alert levels, wherever appropriate, reporting systems). - Evidence that the operator's risk assessment processes, including residual risks, are evaluated regularly. - Safety assurance takes into account activities carried out at the interfaces internally and externally (i.e. stakeholders): evidence of risk controls applied by contracted organisations / third parties, other departments being assessed and overseen (e.g. quality check, reviews, and regular meetings). - Information from safety assurance and compliance monitoring activities feeds back into the safety risk management process. - Review where risk controls have been changed as a result of the assessment. - What type of information and sources may support the safety performance measurement? - Check to which extent the operator pays attention to information stemming from internal and external occurrences, outcome of Regulation (EU) 376/2014, safety objectives, investigation reports; automatic data collection (such as flight data monitoring for air operators); safety meetings, workshops, seminars, hazard reports, sector risk profile; audits and statistics from the compliance monitoring function, safety data analysis, SSP and/or SPAS, (industry and/or EASA) safety roadmaps, EPAS, ICAO's or EASA's or State's Annual Safety Report / Review (ASR) or recognized International Organisations (like IATA, CANSO) ASRs; State safety promotion, surveillance & acceptance of the SPIs/SPTs by the State etc.	☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations	PSOE	Eval	Description
		Consider how human performance (ICAO doc.10151) is taken into consideration when contributing to the safety performance and assurance of safety.			
3.1 Safety performance monitoring and measurement, 3.1.2 Verification of the safety performance in reference to safety performance indicators and targets					
ORO.GEN.200(a)(3)	(d) <u>Safety performance monitoring and measurement</u> (1) Safety performance monitoring and measurement should be the process by which the safety performance of the operator is verified in comparison to the safety policy and objectives. (2) This process should include safety reporting, safety studies, safety reviews, safety audits and safety surveys.	Present There is a documented process in place to measure the safety performance of the operator, covering all the appropriate areas, including qualitative and quantitative means linked to the operator's safety objectives and to measure the effectiveness of safety risk controls.	Suitable The quantitative means are focused on what is important rather than what is easy to measure. Reliability of data sources is considered in the design of qualitative means and/or quantitative means such as SPIs and SPTs. The qualitative and quantitative means are linked to the identified risks, the effectiveness of the safety barriers and the safety objectives. Frequency of and responsibility for the trend monitoring of qualitative means are defined. Realistic targets have been set, wherever appropriate Qualitative and quantitative means related to the State safety objectives from the SSP/SPAS are taken into consideration, as applicable. The qualitative and quantitative means consider key internal and external interfaces (or risks at the interfaces), when meaningful.	Operating The safety performance of the operator is being measured through qualitative and quantitative means, which are being continuously monitored and analysed for trends, wherever appropriate. The effectiveness of safety risk controls is being measured and supports actionable decisions. Frequency and responsibility for the trend monitoring of qualitative/quantitative means are appropriate and reliable.	Effective The qualitative and quantitative means are demonstrating the safety performance of the operator and the effectiveness of risk controls based on reliable data. The qualitative and quantitative means are reviewed; regularly updated to ensure they remain relevant, then reviewed with the relevant SMS governance body and allow the maturation of the operator's SMS. Where the qualitative and quantitative means indicate a risk control not being effective, appropriate action is taken. The State's safety objectives on the SSP/SPAS are appropriately considered, when relevant, and continuous discussion with the State drives the continuous improvement of the process.
		- How is safety performance monitored and measured? Check that the defined SPIs, SPTs, alert levels and targets, when used and defined, are appropriate to the operator's activities, risks, and safety objectives. - Verify that the interfaces having an impact on the performance of the SMS are appropriately considered. - How does the occurrence reporting scheme efficiently and timely enable the measurement and evaluation of the operator's safety performance? Liaison with Regulation (EU) 376/2014. Hook with the continuous improvement of the SMS.	☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations	PSOE	Eval	Description
		- How does 'compliance monitoring' feed the monitoring and measurement of the operator's safety performance? - Evidence that the qualitative means or quantitative means such as SPIs, SPTs, alert levels are based on any kind of reliable data-feeding sources to inform the performance of the operator and the progress made on the achievement of the safety objectives. - Evidence of when the qualitative and quantitative means were last reviewed. - The qualitative means such as the SPIs are focused on what is important rather than what is easy to measure. SPIs are focused on the safety objectives and the effectiveness of the safety barriers, notably on the preventive ones: check that they allow the maturation of the operator's performance over time. - Evidence that the operator's qualitative and quantitative means are balanced (leading / lagging, State-level / self-generated / representative of safety objectives) and accurately represent the risk picture of individual organisations and can serve as a tool for the monitoring of their safety performance. - Evidence that, when the alert levels have been reached, the operator takes adequate actions and report at higher level, when appropriate (SRB, safety committees etc.) - Consideration of any State's safety objectives (stemming from SSP and/or SPAS) - Consider whether the monitoring of the safety objectives, including relevant SPIs in the EPAS,. - Consider any relevant safety performance indicator or target stemming from Regulation (EU) 376/2014, or EASA ASR24 or any other occurrence reporting system (internal, voluntary etc.), ICAO's or State's Annual Safety Report / Review (ASR) or recognized International Organisations (like IATA, CANSO) ASRs. - Review whether any action has been taken when the monitoring of the performance indicates a negative trend (reflecting non-effective risk control(s) or inappropriate qualitative/quantitative means or negative impact on the operator's performance). - Verify whether any standard SPIs or targets used in a risk sector profile or safety roadmap or standard monitoring process (e.g. flight data monitoring programme for Air Ops; ANS performance scheme) or valuable Industry good practices / standards are being considered. - Evidence that results of safety performance monitoring are discussed for its safety relevance at senior management level (or SRB or any Safety committees or any other appropriate level of Authority within the organisation, as appropriate). Hook with the continuous improvement of the SMS. - Evidence of feedback provided to the AM. - Evidence, where alert levels are relevant, that, when the alert levels associated to SPTs have been reached, the operator takes adequate actions and reviews its safety objectives, wherever needed.			

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
3.2 Management of change						
ORO.GEN.200(a)(3)	The operator should manage safety risks related to a change. The management of change should be a documented process to identify external and internal change that may have an adverse effect on safety. It should make use of the operator’s existing hazard identification, risk assessment and mitigation processes.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		The operator has established a change management process to identify whether changes have an impact on safety activities and to manage significant, identified risks in accordance with existing safety risk management processes. Methods, responsibilities, and timelines are defined in the process.	Triggers for the change management process are defined. The process also considers business related changes and interfaces with other organisations/departments, having an impact on safety.	The operator is using a defined change management process to identify whether substantive changes have an impact on safety. Any identified risks are managed in accordance with existing safety risk management processes and are monitored through safety assurance. Internal and external factors such as Technical, Environmental, Human and Organisational related hazards are being considered, as appropriate.		The Management of change process considers the accumulation or impact of multiple changes, and the change and impact to safety-related functions are communicated with other organisations, including internal and external stakeholders. There is a means to share information with respect to management of change impact with external stakeholders (partners, suppliers, contractors, etc.). Safety risks are being managed consistent with the scope and time scale associated with the change. Risk mitigation actions resulting from management of change are part of the SMS performance monitoring.
		• Key stakeholders are involved in the process. This may include individuals from other departments of the operator and/or external organisations. • Review what triggers the ‘management of changes’ process. Consider organisational, financial, commercial factors etc. as well as any other change that may affect safety (e.g. security, cybersecurity, environment, sanitary crisis, sickness, or staff retirement & transfer of knowledge). • Review recent changes that have been through the risk assessment process. • Check that change is signed off by an appropriately authorised person. • Transitional risks are being identified and managed. • Review follow up actions such as whether any assumptions made have been validated. • Review whether there is an impact on previous risk assessments and existing hazards. • Review whether consideration is given to the cumulative effect of multiple changes. • Review that business-related changes have considered safety risks (organisational restructuring, upsizing, or downsizing, IT projects, etc.). • Evidence of Human Performance (HP) issues being addressed during changes. • Assess whether the risk mitigation actions resulting from these changes are evident and consistent with positive performance monitoring trends. • Review impact of change on training and competencies.	☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R		

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations	PSOE	Eval	Description
		- Review previous changes to confirm they remain under control. - Consider how the reasons for these changes are communicated and how the changes are planned and communicated to those people affected by the change externally and internally. Consider how stakeholders (other departments, partners, suppliers, contractors, Authorities) affected by the changes are involved in the process. - Review whether the standard contractual arrangements address 'management of changes' on both contractual sides. Check evidence of implementation.			
3.3 Continuous improvement of the SMS					
ORO.GEN.200(a)(3)	(f) <u>Continuous improvement</u> The operator should continuously seek to improve its safety performance. Continuous improvement should be achieved through: (1) proactive and reactive evaluations of facilities, equipment, documentation and procedures through safety audits and surveys; (2) proactive evaluation of individuals' performance to verify the fulfilment of their safety responsibilities; and (3) reactive evaluations in order to verify the effectiveness of the system for control and mitigation of risk.	Present There is a documented process in place to monitor and review the effectiveness of the SMS using the available data and information.	Suitable The overall system, including the Safety assurance activities, is producing SMS data / information that is being periodically reviewed by the safety management organisation to improve SMS implementation. External information is considered in addition to internal information. Appropriate senior managers are notably involved when it affects different departments. The decision making is data informed.	Operating There is evidence of the SMS being periodically reviewed to support the assessment of its effectiveness and appropriate action being taken. The SMS is being periodically reviewed by the senior management team to support the assessment of its effectiveness and that appropriate actions are being taken. The operator is using SMS and safety data to develop and assess effectiveness of the SPIs to enhance safety and c ous improvement of SMS processes	Effective The assessment of SMS effectiveness uses multiple sources of information including the safety data analysis that supports decisions for continuous improvements. The measurement of the operator's safety performance addresses the continuous improvement of the SMS in a proactive manner, as well as the safety objectives, which are regularly updated. The contribution of SMS and safety data from key external interface organisations is taken into consideration. A robust and comprehensive set of SMS and safety data is developed [SMS Database with data governance] that supports the use of predictive data analysis. The operator shares best practices and lessons learned as a global leader in SMS.
		What type of information and sources support the continuous improvement of the SMS? Check to which extent the operator pays attention to information stemming from internal and external sources, outcome of Regulation (EU) 376/2014, investigation reports; automatic data collection (such as flight data monitoring for air operators); safety meetings, workshops, seminars, hazard reports, sector risk profile; audits and statistics from the CMF, safety data analysis, SSP and/or SPAS, industry and EASA safety roadmaps such as for rotorcraft, EPAS (notably section 4 where SPIs are proposed for monitoring), ICAO or EASA Annual Safety Review (ASR) or State ASR or recognized International Organisations (like IATA, CANSO) ASRs; State safety promotion, surveillance & acceptance of the SPIs/SPTs by the State etc.	☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
		- Review the information and safety data used for management decision making for continuous improvement. - Evidence of: - Lessons learnt being incorporated into SMS and operational processes. - Best practices being sought and embraced. - Surveys and assessments of organisational culture being carried out and acted upon. - Data being analysed and results shared with Safety Committees. - Evidence of follow up actions. - How does the measurement of the service provider’s safety performance liaise with the safety objectives? How are such processes updated? Check whether a methodology is used to so that safety objectives are expressed and matured; - Check that the Safety SPTs linked to the operator’s safety objectives are being monitored for continuous improvement over time (as a minimum) as expressed in Regulation (EU) 1139/2018. - Assess the willingness and leadership of the senior management at continuously improving the SMS, taking into consideration the induced cost and return of investment.’				
4. Safety promotion						
4.1. Training/competence, 4.1.1 Training and education (SMS training programme)						
ORO.GEN.200(a)(4)	(a) The operator shall establish, implement and maintain a management system that includes: (4) maintaining personnel trained and competent to perform their tasks; All personnel should receive safety training as appropriate for their safety responsibilities.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		There is a training programme for SMS in place that includes initial and recurrent training.	The training covers individual safety duties (including roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities) and how the operator’s SMS operates. Training material and methodology are adapted to the audience and include Human Performance when relevant. All staff requiring training are identified.	The SMS training programme is delivering appropriate training to the different staff in the operator and being delivered by competent personnel.		SMS Training is evaluated for all aspects (learning objectives, content, teaching methods and styles, tests) and is linked to the competency assessment. Training is routinely reviewed to take into consideration feedback from different sources.
		- Review the SMS training programme including course content and delivery method. - Check that the training covers individual safety duties (including roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities) and how the operator’s SMS operates.		☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R	

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
		- Does the training consider feedback from external occurrences, investigation reports, safety meetings, hazard reports, audits, safety data analysis, training, course evaluations etc.? - Check that the training includes human and organisational factors, just culture and non-technical skills with the intent of reducing organisational risks that may lead to human errors. - Check training records against the training programme. - Review how the competence of the trainers is being assessed and maintained. - Check whether there is a process in place to measure the effectiveness of training and to take appropriate action to improve subsequent training. How the effectiveness of the training is rated? - Review how training is assessed for new staff and changes in position. - Review any training evaluation. - Ask staff about their own understanding of their safety duties in the operator’s SMS. - Check all staff are reminded of compliance on top of SMS. - How are the continuous improvement of the SMS as well as the monitoring and measurement of the service provider’s safety performance, including the update of the safety objectives, taken into consideration the recurrent safety training?			☐ N/R	
4.1. Training/competence, 4.1.2 Competence (maintenance and evaluation)						
ORO.GEN.200(a)(4)	(a) The operator shall establish, implement and maintain a management system that includes: (4) <u>maintaining personnel trained</u> and competent to perform their tasks;	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		A competency framework is defined for the staff having an impact on Safety, including trainers.	There is a process in place to periodically assess the actual safety competency of personnel against the framework.	There is evidence of the competency assessment process being used and being recorded.		The competence assessment programme and process are routinely reviewed and improved. The competence assessment takes appropriate remedial action when necessary and feeds into the training programme.
		- Review how is competence assessment carried out on initial recruitment and recurrently. - Is there a process that evaluates the individual’s competence and takes appropriate remedial action when necessary? Does it consider ‘human performance’? - Check whether the competence assessment includes competence assessment safety duties and responsibilities, as well as compliance management. - Is the competence of trainers defined and assessed? - Are appropriate remedial actions taken when necessary? - In the case of international contracts, check that all relevant personnel have sufficient skills in the common language, such as English and in the use of the documentation.		☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R	

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
4.2 Safety communication						
ORO.GEN.200(a)(4) ORO.AOC.130	<u>Communication</u> (1) The operator should establish communication about safety matters that: (i) ensures that all personnel are aware of the safety management activities as appropriate for their safety responsibilities; (ii) conveys safety critical information, especially relating to assessed risks and analysed hazards; (iii) explains why particular actions are taken; and (iv) explains why safety procedures are introduced or changed. (2) Regular meetings with personnel where information, actions and procedures are discussed may be used to communicate safety matters. <u>FDM (aeroplanes with MCTOM>27t):</u> The operator should pass on the lessons learnt to all relevant personnel	Present There is a process to communicate safety critical information.	Suitable The process determined what, when, and how safety information needs to be communicated. The process includes contracted organisations and personnel, where appropriate. The means of communication are adapted to: - The size and complexity of the organisation; - the audience and the significance of what is being communicated.	Operating Safety critical information is being identified and communicated throughout the organisation to all personnel, as relevant, including contracted organisations and personnel where appropriate.		Effective The operator analyses and communicates safety critical information effectively through a variety of blended methods, as appropriate, to maximise it being understood. Safety communication is assessed to determine how it is being used and understood, and to improve it where appropriate. The promotion of the safety policy and its positive safety culture is visible. Decision making, actions, and communication reflect a positive safety culture and safety leadership demonstrating commitment to the safety policy.
		• Review the sources of information used for safety communication, which includes FDM if applicable. • Review the methods used to communicate safety information e.g., meetings, presentations, briefings, videos, emails, websites, newsletters, leaflets, bulletins, posters etc. • Assess whether the means of communication is appropriate, based on the operator's structure and the audience. The communication should be simple and concise so that it is easily understood. • Is the means for safety communication being reviewed for effectiveness and material used to update relevant training? • Check that lessons learned, significant events, changes and investigation outcomes are being communicated. • Check that a positive safety culture is regularly promoted, enhancing 'reporting culture' (where, how, when etc.) and the principles of 'just culture'. • Check accessibility to safety information. • Ask staff about any recent safety communication. • Review whether information from occurrences is timely communicated to key stakeholders (internal and external) and whether it has been appropriately dis-identified. • Does the operator extend safety communication, as appropriate, to external key stakeholders (e.g., customers, suppliers)? • Check whether the staff know where to find the safety objectives and associated safety performance monitoring? Check whether the staff know the safety	☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R		

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations		PSOE	Eval	Description
		objectives in their domain of competence? Does the operator communicate the status of safety objectives' achievement or monitoring?				
5. Additional items to be considered						
5.1 Interface management						
ORO.GEN.205(a)(2)	(a) When contracting or purchasing any services or products as a part of its activities, the operator shall ensure all of the following: (2) that any aviation safety hazards associated with contracted or purchased services or products are considered by the operator's management system.	Present	Suitable	Operating		Effective
		The operator has identified and documented the relevant internal and external interfaces and the critical nature of such interfaces.	The way the interfaces are managed is appropriate to the criticality in terms of safety. The means for communicating safety information is defined. The contracts adequately addressed the safety critical nature of the interfaces and the need to appropriately feed the Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA), including the risk mitigations.	The operator is managing the interfaces through hazard identification and risk management. There is assurance activity to assess risk mitigations being delivered by external organisations.		The operator has a good understanding of interface management and there is evidence that the safety critical nature of the interface risks is being identified and acted upon. Interfacing organisations are sharing safety information, management of changes and take actions when needed. Evidence shows that a positive safety culture is promoted with interfacing organisations.
		- Review how interfaces internally (with other departments) and externally (e.g. contractors, customers, State) have been identified and documented. Review the system description of the interfaces, should it be documented in the SMS manual or any other equivalent document. - If several operators forming part of a single air carrier business grouping use the same CAMO for the continuing airworthiness management of all aircraft they operate, review how the interfaces between that group CAMO and all the different operators involved are properly addressed. In particular, the continuing airworthiness management contracts shall describe how the individual management systems of the operators and of the CAMO are harmonised between each other. - Evidence that: - Safety critical issues, areas and associated hazards are identified; - Safety occurrences are being reported and addressed; - Risk controls actions are applied and regularly reviewed; - Interfaces are reviewed periodically. - The operator's SMS covers hazard identification for the external services, activities and internal interfaces. - Training and safety promotion sessions are organised with relevant external organisations. - External organisations participate in SMS activities and share safety information. - Review how positive safety culture is promoted at the interfaces.	☐ P ☐ S ☐ O ☐ E	☐ N/A ☐ C ☐ NC ☐ R ☐ N/R		

Reference	Inspection topics	Specific requirements/expectations	PSOE	Eval	Description
		- The operator's occurrences reporting system needs to extend to the external organisations, wherever appropriate. - Management of changes impacting safety are appropriately addressed through the contracts.			